We present a dynamic model of an IPO market in which firms go public to raise capital for investment. The original shareholders have inside information with respect to the quality of their firm's investment opportunities, and they decide whether to go public, how much capital to raise and invest, and how to price the IPO. Outside investors are of one of two types: some investors know and understand even the not directly observable economic incentives of the original shareholders, whereas all other investors learn about the IPO market only from the publicly observable IPO market data. Market participation by the latter investors can upset the stationary rational equilibrium and give rise to a dynamic equilibrium that is characterized by: (1) IPO underpricing, (2) underperformance of IPO shares in the long run, and (3) cyclical variations in IPO volume. Learning investors upset the stationary equilibrium not because of ex ante unreasonable beliefs, but because they fail to condition their beliefs on variables that convey only redundant information in the stationary equilibrium. The model provides a joint explanation for the three empirically documented IPO market "anomalies," and it yields a number of new testable empirical predictions.
I Introduction
Financial economists have documented at least three puzzling empirical regularities in the market for initial public offerings of common stock: IPO underpricing, i.e. positive excess returns in the short run; strong concentration of IPO activity in certain periods; and underperformance of IPO shares in the long run.
The first empirical evidence on IPO underpricing dates back to a study by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1963. A large body of subsequent empirical research has confirmed the finding that IPOs tend to be substantially underpriced in the U.S., as well as internationally. 1 Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) present evidence of the existence of "hot issue" markets, which they define as periods during which the initial performance of IPOs is exceptionally high. Moreover, they find evidence of a strong concentration of IPO activity in certain periods.
Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) report that similar patterns can be observed internationally. Evidence of long-run underperformance of IPO shares was first presented by Ritter (1991) , who also finds that underperformance was most severe for firms that went public during certain years of high IPO activity. Further evidence on IPO underperformance in the long run is presented by Loughran and Ritter (1995) .
Much of the theoretical research on IPOs has focused on explaining IPO underpricing. Possible reasons for underpricing include self-interested investment bankers (Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron (1982) ), the "winner's curse" (Rock (1986) ), lawsuit avoidance (Tiniç (1988) and Hughes and Thakor (1992) ), signaling (Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , and Welch (1989) ), market incompleteness (Mauer and Senbet (1992) ), bookbuilding (Benveniste and Spindt (1989) ), and informational cascades (Welch (1992) ). Evidence suggests also that in some countries IPO underpricing may be due to the regulatory environment (see Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994)), or because the allocation of IPO shares can be used as a bribe.
One possible explanation for the strong fluctuations in IPO volume is that the cost of issuing 1 See Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) for a survey of the research on initial public offerings. Loughran, Ritter, and equity varies across the business cycle. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) present a model in which the business cycle causes adverse selection costs to vary over time. Adverse selection costs are lower in periods of economic expansion which leads firms to issue equity primarily during such times. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda also provide some evidence in support of their model.
Although their paper is about seasoned equity offerings, it is conceivable that varying degrees of asymmetric information across the business cycle also affect the market for initial public offerings. Lowry (2003) investigates empirically whether the fluctuations in IPO volume can be explained by the aggregate capital demands of private firms, by the adverse selection costs of issuing equity, or by the level of investor optimism. She finds that all three factors are statistically significant, but that only the firms' aggregate capital demand and investor sentiment appear to be economically significant determinants of IPO volume. Lowry and Schwert (2002) report a significant positive lead-lag relation between initial returns and future IPO volume. They provide evidence suggesting that this lead-lag relationship between initial returns an IPO volume may be driven by information that is learned by the underwriter during the registration period, but that is not fully incorporated into the offer price.
If one is willing to accept the view that IPO shares tend to underperform the market in the long run then rational explanations of this phenomenon appear hard to come by. 2 Most of the literature on this topic therefore empirical and points in the direction of limited investor rationality and 2 Whether IPO shares really underperform the market in the long run has recently been subject to some debate.
See Brav and Gompers (1997) , Eckbo and Norly (2000) , and Loughran and Ritter (2000) .
psychological finance. 3 However, one possible rational explanation is that IPO underperformance is due to investor learning. Morris (1996) presents a model in which investors share a common prior belief with respect to the value of IPO firms, but in which they have different prior beliefs with respect to the distribution of the firm values. In this setting, "speculative bubbles" can occur, in which IPOs are sold at a price that is above each individual investor's valuation. In such a bubble each investor anticipates to be able to sell his shares in the aftermarket to an investor with a higher valuation. IPOs underperform as investors learn about the true distribution of the firm values in the long run.
The to our knowledge only theory that links all three IPO market anomalies to a single cause is due to Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2001) . They attribute all three phenomena to the existence of a class of investors who are, at times, irrationally exuberant about the prospects of IPOs. In their model the selling policy that is in the issuer's best interest usually involves staggered sales.
Underpricing happens to compensate the regular (institutional) investors for the risk of losing money on their inventory in the event that the hot issue market ends prematurely.
We propose an alternative theory that is also capable of jointly explaining IPO underpricing, fluctuations in IPO volume, and long-run underperformance of IPO shares. In our model firms go public to raise capital for investment. IPO underpricing is a rational equilibrium outcome that obtains as a result of the original shareholders' personal wealth maximization under asymmetric information. Periods of high IPO activity and long-run underperformance are attributable to the presence of investors who learn about the IPO market based on publicly observable performance of past IPOs.
The structure of our model is quite simple. We assume universal risk neutrality and model
IPOs as direct transactions between entrepreneurs and investors. Nature randomly creates investment opportunities that are of one of two types (profitable or unprofitable). Each investment opportunity is available to a single personal wealth maximizing entrepreneur who is privately informed about its profitability. Undertaking the investment opportunity requires an IPO to raise capital for investment. Depending on the terms at which equity can be sold the entrepreneurs decide whether to go public, how much capital to raise and invest, and how to price an IPO.
Under plausible conditions some entrepreneurs find it optimal to augment the information that is conveyed by their investment decisions to outsiders by underpricing their IPOs. In equilibrium, the combination of IPO pricing and investment choice signals the quality of a firm's investment opportunities.
We then introduce a class of investors who learn about the IPO market only based on publicly observable data, such as the performance of past IPOs. Intuitively, these investors are like statisticians who lack a structural model of the world, and who try to understand the IPO market just from looking at the data. In the stationary equilibrium these investors can learn to infer the value of an IPO from the issuing firm's investment policy alone. The issue price of an IPO does not convey any additional information.
Learning investors will eventually be able to infer which IPOs are underpriced, and also by how much. However, while learning investors may eventually be able to forecast which IPOs are underpriced, they cannot infer from the data why these IPOs are underpriced. It is consistent with the beliefs of these investor to purchase any IPO that is issued at a price weakly below its inferred expected value. This creates an opportunity for some issuing firms to sell equity at a price closer to its fair value, but it also alters the incentives of those entrepreneurs that did not previously find it profitable to go public. In our model even a slight increase in the price at which firms can issue equity can alter the incentives of lower quality firms. This results in an increase in IPO volume, and a sudden drop in the average IPO quality that leads to subsequent IPO underperformance. 4 After a period of high IPO activity the IPO market reverts back to the rational equilibrium as long-run underperformance leads the learning investors to revise their beliefs downwards.
The main empirical implications of our model are as follows. (1 firms to issue equity at a higher price, which results in a subsequent increase in IPO activity. (6) Our model predicts that periods of exceptionally high IPO volume come to an end when investors begin to learn about the true fundamental value of these firms. (7) Finally, our model suggests that the variance of the long run performance of firms that go public during periods of high IPO volume should be much large than that of firms that go public during periods of low IPO activity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in Section II.
Section III discusses the rational IPO market equilibrium in the absence of learning. Section IV contains the analysis of investor learning and the dynamic IPO market equilibrium. Section V summarizes the empirical implications, and Section VI concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
II The Model

A The Economy
Consider an economy with firms that are initially privately held by owner-managers ("entrepreneurs"). The distinctive feature of entrepreneurs is that they may have access to additional physical investment opportunities, whereas the remaining agents in the economy ("investors")
have only access to financial market investments. All agents in the economy are risk neutral and maximize their respective personal wealth. There are no transaction costs or taxes, and the interest rate is zero.
B Firms, Entrepreneurs, and IPOs
Nature creates investment opportunities in discrete time intervals, ∆t > 0. At each point in time, t j = t 0 + j∆t, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, nature creates a physical investment opportunity with probability λ ∈ (0, 1). Any such investment opportunity is available only to a single entrepreneur.
An investment opportunity that opens up has to be undertaken immediately, or it ceases to exist.
We assume that firms are all-equity financed, and that additional investment can only be financed by means of an initial public offering (IPO) of common stock. This could be, for example, because entrepreneurs do not have any own funds to pay for the additional investment, asymmetric information or agency problems rule out debt financing, and the wealth of each individual investor is too small to allow a private equity placement.
The value of any firm's assets in place prior to (or without) an IPO is equal to A > 0. 5 An investment opportunity is of one of two types that we refer to as type-G ("good") and type-B ("bad") respectively. 6 Firms differ only in terms of their investment opportunities so that we will refer to a firm with access to a type-G (type-B) project as a type-G (type-B) firm and to its original shareholder as a type-G (type-B) entrepreneur.
The (expected) marginal profit function of a type-T project is denoted by π T (I). Marginal profit functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable functions of investment with the following properties:
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(A1) A type-G project yields higher marginal returns on investment than a type-B project, 5 The assumption that firms do not differ in terms of the value of their assets in place is a simplifying assumption that is not crucial for our results. 6 An extension of the model to more than two types is straightforward but tedious.
7 None of these assumptions is crucial for the main results of the model. The assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A4), are merely technical assumptions that allow us to keep the analysis simple. Even if we relaxed assumption (A3) by assuming that both types have a positive NPV project we could obtain IPO underpricing, long-run underperformance, and fluctuations in the amount of equity that is issued. However, we could not obtain fluctuations in the number of IPOs that take place.
irrespective of the level of investment: π B (I) < π G (I) for all I ≥ 0.
(A2) Projects exhibit decreasing returns to scale: π T (I) < 0 for all I > 0, T ∈ {G, B}.
(A3) Only type-G projects have a positive expected NPV:
(A4) Marginal gross returns on investment are non-negative. This means that marginal losses from inefficient investment never exceed the additional investment outlay:
The ex ante probability that an investment opportunity is type-G is equal to p ∈ (0, 1), and the probability that it is type-B is equal to 1 − p. The project type is initially private information of the entrepreneur and it is not verifiable ex post.
We abstract from the existence of financial intermediaries and model IPOs as direct transactions between entrepreneurs and investors. Our assumption of universal risk neutrality implies that entrepreneurs have no incentive to sell equity for diversification purposes. The sole purpose of the IPO in our model is to raise capital for investment, which means that the entire proceeds from the issue will be invested in the firm. 8 We assume that a firm without access to a physical investment opportunity cannot go public. 9 The value of a type-T firm that raises and invests I dollars is equal to the expected value of its future cash flows:
Conditional on a physical investment opportunity being available, an entrepreneur can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer I, α ∈ [0, ∞) × [0, 1] to outside investors, where I denotes the amount of capital raised and invested, and α denotes the fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur.
The offer 0, 1 represents the special case that the entrepreneur does not raise any capital and instead retains full ownership of her firm. 8 We rule out the possibility that a firm invests the proceeds from the equity issue in marketable securities or just holds cash. Moreover, the original shareholder's informational advantage implies that outsiders would view any attempt to sell more equity than necessary to finance the intended investment policy as a negative signal of the firm quality.
9 Hence, at most one IPO can take place at any given point in time.
By assumption, an entrepreneur chooses the IPO that maximizes her expected terminal wealth.
As a tie breaker we assume that an entrepreneur who is indifferent between her first-best IPO and some alternative IPO will stick to her first-best IPO. The total wealth of a type-T entrepreneur who manages to sell an IPO I, α is equal to the value of her retained equity,
An entrepreneur's payoff from unsuccessfully attempting an IPO I, α is assumed to be equal to
zero. An entrepreneur whose IPO has failed cannot approach the market again.
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For any IPO, I, α , we can calculate the firm valuation that is implicit in the terms of the IPO as
It is clear that V i (I, α) need not be identical to the true firm value. If V i (I, α) exceeds the true firm value then the IPO is overpriced, and if V i (I, α) is smaller then the true firm value then the IPO is underpriced. Outside investors just break even on purchasing (1 − α) of a firm's equity for I dollars whenever the true firm value is identical to (3).
For each IPO I, α we can now find an equivalent representation I, V i (I, α) , where
denotes the firm value that is implicit in the terms of the IPO. For convenience we will refer to V i (I, α) in the following as "the issue price".
Which of the two above IPO representations is going to be more convenient depends on the questions that we will address. The representation I, α captures the entrepreneur's tradeoff between raising more capital and retaining more equity. This representation will be very intuitive when it comes to analyzing the decision problem of an entrepreneur. The representation I, V i (I, α) emphasizes the link between investment policy and firm value. This representation will be more intuitive when it comes to analyzing investor learning and the resulting IPO market dynamics.
10 Neither of these assumptions is crucial for our model. Our main results would still hold if an entrepreneur could approach the market again after a failed first attempt to sell an IPO, or if we assumed a different (fixed) payoff from a failed IPO.
We assume that all uncertainty with respect to a firm's cash flows is resolved exactly periods after its IPO. At that time, the firm value is publicly revealed to be equal to V T (I) +δ T (I), wherẽ δ T (I) is a random variable with zero expected mean.
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C Investors
Investors can either purchase stocks or hold cash, but they cannot short sell IPO shares. 12 Whether an investor decides to participate in a particular IPO depends on the terms of the IPO, and on his belief with respect to the value of the offering firm, V . 13 An investor will participate in an IPO whenever he expects to at least break even, that is, whenever
A crucial assumption in our model is the existence of two types of investors that differ in terms of their knowledge and their understanding of the IPO market.
C.1 R-Investors
The first group of investors, that we refer to as "R-investors", are rational in the usual game theoretic sense. These investors are assumed to have all the information about the firms with the exception of the individual firm types. The R-investors can therefore infer each entrepreneur type's expected payoff from every feasible strategy, which means that they understand even the not directly observable economic incentives of the entrepreneurs. They condition their beliefs with respect to the firm value, V R , on the firm's investment policy, as well as on the fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur. Following (4), R-investors demand shares in an IPO whenever
11 The only purpose of this stochastic component is to ensure that the firm type is not verifiable ex post. To account for limited liability we have to assume thatδ T (I) is bounded from below by −V T (I).
12 This assumption is necessary to obtain long-run underperformance of IPO shares in our model. 13 It will be more convenient to specify the investors' beliefs with respect to the firm value ( V ), rather than with respect to the probabilities that they assign to the event that the firm is of the high type (μ).
Note that R-investors may alternatively be viewed as conditioning their beliefs on I and V i (I, α), so that (5) may be stated equivalently as
C.2 L-Investors
The second group of investors, that we refer to as "L-investors", are not irrational, but they learn about the IPO market only from the publicly observable performance of past IPOs. Intuitively, an L-investor is like a statistician who lacks a structural model of the world, and who tries to understand the world just from looking at the data.
We will see that L-investors may learn to predict the value of an IPO based on the issuing firm's investment policy alone. We therefore assume that L-investors condition their beliefs, V L , on the firm's investment policy, and that they demand shares in an IPO as long as it is offered at a price weakly below its inferred expected value,
L-investors are not ignoring how much of the firm's equity is offered in exchange for the capital that is raised in the IPO, but they differ from R-investors in that they view the choice of α merely as a pricing decision.
We will discuss the learning by L-investors in more detail in Subsection II.E, after the sequence of events for an individual IPO has been specified.
C.3 IPO Market Regimes
We denote the number of R-investors and the number of L-investors in the economy by N R and N L , respectively. It is crucial that we assume that N R and N L are sufficiently large so that each group of investors by itself can purchase all IPOs in the economy. This assumption implies that an entrepreneur may sell the IPO to the group of investors with the highest valuation for the shares. Depending on whether IPOs are offered at a price (weakly) below or (strictly) above the R-investors' valuation we distinguish between two IPO market regimes that we refer to as "regime-R" and "regime-L", respectively.
. . .
IPO takes place. The first market clearing price is determined in public trading.
Nature reveals the true firm value.
Underpricing
Long run performance 
D Sequence of Events for an Individual IPO
Up to three events can take place in our model at any given point in time, t j : (1) there is a public trading session in which the market clearing prices of all firms that previously issued equity are determined, (2) if a firm issued equity at t j− then the true value of this firm's cash flows is publicly revealed, and (3) a firm that is not yet publicly listed may undertake an IPO. To avoid ambiguities we assume that these events take place in the aforementioned sequence. We may think of the trading session, the revelation of the realized cash flows, and the IPO taking place at times t j − , t j , and t j + , respectively. This particular sequencing implies that no new information becomes available between the time at which an IPO is sold to investors (t j + ), and the trading session in which its first market clearing price is determined (at t j+1 − ). Moreover, the time-t j market clearing prices of all publicly traded firms and the true fundamental value of any firm that went public at t j− are already common knowledge when the time-t j IPO is offered to the public.
The time line of events for an individual IPO firm is depicted in Figure 1 .
Whenever we are primarily interested in the dynamic aspects of the IPO market we will denote the time-t j+k price of the firm that went public at t j by V j,j+k . For a successful IPO that takes place at t j a time series of firm prices, V j,j+k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}, is observed. The issue price, V j,j , is set by the entrepreneur, and it is identical to (3). All subsequent prices are market clearing prices that are determined by the investors with the highest valuation for the shares. At t j+ all uncertainty with respect to the true firm value is resolved, and the true firm value is publicly revealed. Hence, we have
We measure the abnormal initial performance (i.e. underpricing) of an IPO by its stock price performance from t j to t j+1 . The long run performance of IPO shares is measured either based on the offer price (i.e. from time t j to t j+ ), or based on the first market clearing price (i.e. from t j+1
to t j+ ), since our model yields separate predictions for the two time horizons.
E Learning by L-Investors
We denote the L-investors' time-t j belief with respect to the value of a firm that raises and invests
belief with respect to the value of a firm that raises and invests I dollars. We assume that this prior is distributed according to some probability density function, g(·), with compact support.
The probability density function is assumed to be common knowledge, but the prior itself is private information of the L-investors. The (finite) weight that L-investors assign to their prior is denoted by ω 0 (I).
14 For convenience we assume that ω 0 (I) is common knowledge.
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To formalize the updating of beliefs by L-investors we define the indicator functions
for each j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. In addition, we define
which is the sum of the weight of the L-investors' t 0 -prior, and of the number of IPOs of size I that took place prior to t j .
L-investors update their beliefs whenever the first market clearing price for an IPO is observed, and whenever new information on a publicly listed firm becomes available. By assumption, the latter is the case at t j if and only if a firm went public at t j− . The expected development of the L-investors' beliefs at a given point in time therefore depends not only on the current IPO market regime, but also on the IPO market regime periods ago.
Assuming Bayesian updating, the L-investors' updated time-t j belief may be expressed as
The three terms in (12) represent the investors' time-t j−1 belief, the first market clearing price of any time-t j−1 IPO, and any change in the market value of a firm that issued equity at t j− due to the arrival of new public information. Note that (12) can alternatively be stated as
14 A weight ω0(I) = k means that the weight that type-L investors assign to their prior is equivalent to the weight that they would assign to k independent observations. 15 Assuming that only one of the parameters that determine the L-investors' beliefs is private information implies that all other agents in the economy fully understand the L-investors' beliefs after observing only a single IPO in regime-L. This limits the number of special cases that we have to consider (see Lemma 5) without affecting the main insights that can be gained from our model.
which reveals that the type-L investors' time-t j belief with respect to the value of a firm that raises and invests I dollars is just a weighted average of their time-t 0 prior, and of the current market values of all publicly listed firms that followed the same investment policy in the past.
III The Rational IPO Market Equilibrium in the Absence of
Learning: Regime-R We begin our analysis by deriving the rational IPO market equilibrium that obtains in the absence of learning. That is, we assume initially that the L-investors are not participating in the IPO
market. An in-depth analysis of this equilibrium can be found in a companion paper by the same authors, 16 so that we will skip most of the technical details and some of the proofs in this section and instead focus mainly on the intuition.
A The First-Best Outcome
In the absence of informational asymmetries a type-T entrepreneur can raise I dollars by offering
of her firm's equity to outside investors. The IPO is priced correctly (i.e. V i (I, α F T (I)) = V T (I)), so that outside investors just break even on purchasing the issue.
Since the equity is sold at the fair price, a type-T entrepreneur has no incentive to deviate from her first-best investment policy, denoted by I F T . A type-B entrepreneur therefore does not invest (I F B = 0), and a type-G entrepreneur undertakes the NPV-maximizing investment level that is implicitly defined by π G (I F G ) = 0.
The total payoff to a type-B entrepreneur is equal to W B (0, 1) = A, and the total payoff to a type-G entrepreneur is equal to the sum of her project-NPV and the value of the assets in place:
Both the issue price and the first market clearing price are identical to the true (expected) firm value. Hence, there is no underpricing, and no abnormal stock price performance is observed in the long run.
B Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information
We assume that the first-best outcome is not feasible under asymmetric information. That is, we assume that the bad type's payoff from undertaking the good types's first-best offer exceeds the bad type's payoff from her own first-best strategy:
The intuitive interpretation of (16) is that at the IPO I F G , α F G (I F G ) the bad type's gain from selling overvalued equity exceeds her imitation costs that arise from inefficient investment.
Whenever the first-best outcome is not feasible due to asymmetric information the good type typically has an incentive to deviate from her first-best investment policy to signal her type.
Lemma 1 There exists an investment levelĪ > I F G at which the good type could issue equity at the fair price.
Lemma 1 states that, in principle, the good type could always distinguish herself from the bad type by overinvesting to such an extend that it becomes too costly for the bad type to mimic.
However, doing so would not necessarily be optimal from the point of view of a personal wealth maximizing entrepreneur: while the fact that the good type earns higher marginal returns on investment than the bad type creates an incentive to signal with overinvestment, the necessity to finance this investment with outside equity creates a counteracting incentive to underinvest.
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The direction in which the good type adjusts her investment policy can be determined by looking at the two type's respective marginal rates of substitution between the fraction of retained 17 For all I > 0 the equity of a type-G firm is more valuable than that of a type-B firm since type-G firms earn higher returns on investment than type-B firms. Under asymmetric information type-G firms are therefore faced with higher marginal financing costs than type-B firms.
equity, and the amount of capital that is raised and invested. From (2) we obtain
Based on (17) it can be shown that the good type's second-best strategy entails undertaking only those investments for which its marginal gross return, V G (I) = 1 + π G (I), exceeds the bad type's marginal gross return, V B (I), by a factor greater than the ratio of the two types' respective marginal financing costs, V G (I)/V B (I). 18 That is, the good type will undertake only investments for which her marginal return on investment is sufficiently higher than the bad type's to compensate her for her relatively higher marginal cost of outside equity capital. However, the good type will not increase investment beyondĪ since this investment level is already sufficiently informative to allow an equity issue at the fair price. The good-type's second-best investment policy can therefore be identified as the investment policy, I , that maximizes the ratio
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There exists a (unique) pure-strategy equilibrium in regime-R. To be able to fully characterize this equilibrium we need to calculate the fraction of equity that the entrepreneurs could retain in a pooling equilibrium candidate IPO of size I, in which both firm types issue equity at the average fair price,
and the fraction of equity that a type-G entrepreneur could retain in an IPO of the same size that is priced to prevent the bad type from mimicking,
18 The ratio of the firm values may be interpreted as the ratio of the two type's respective marginal financing costs since both types have to give up the same fraction of equity to raise another dollar of capital.
19 Any equilibrium candidate in which the good type undertakes an investment policy I = I with strictly positive probability fails the "Intuitive Criterion" of Cho and Kreps (1987) : there exist an alternative IPO of size I that makes the good type strictly better but the bad type strictly worse off than the IPO of size I . R-investors therefore have to believe that a firm that offers the IPO of size I is of the good type, and the good type has no incentive to undertake an IPO of size I in the first place. The equilibrium can be supported by the R-investors' beliefs that a firm that defects with an outof-equilibrium investment policy I = I is of the bad type with probability one, and that a firm that defects with an out-of-equilibrium IPO I , α , α > α e G , is of the good type with probability p, and of the bad type with probability 1 − p. These beliefs are admissible under the Intuitive
Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
The intuition underlying these different types of equilibria is as follows. Case a) corresponds to a setting in which for any level of investment the good type's marginal return on investment is sufficiently higher than the bad type's to ensure that good type always prefers a marginal increase in equity financed investment over issuing equity below the fair price. The cases b) and c) correspond to a setting in which this is only initially so. The latter cases are plausible since any investment that the good type chooses to undertake increases the ratio of the firm values, and, hence, increases the ratio of the two types' respective marginal financing costs. Once I has been reached the good type's relative disadvantage on the financing side (vis-à-vis the bad type) begins 20 The values ofĪ, I , and α S G (I ), depend only on the two types' respective marginal profit functions. The value of αP (I ) depends additionally on the probability distribution of the firm types.
to outweigh its relative advantage on the investment side. At I the good type therefore prefers issuing undervalued equity over changing the investment policy in either direction. Whether the equilibrium in this case is a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium in which the good type issues deliberately underpriced equity depends only on the probability distribution of good and bad firms in the economy. The pooling equilibrium exists only if the ex ante probability of a firm being type-G is so high that α P (I ) > α S G (I ). Otherwise the bad type prefers her own first-best payoff over the payoff from the pooling equilibrium candidate IPO. In the latter case the good type can retain α S G (I ) ≥ α P (I ) of the equity without being mimicked by the bad type.
Only Proposition 1.c)'s separating equilibrium with underpricing is of interest to us. We therefore assume for the remainder of the paper that the model parameters are such that they result in this type of equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium of Proposition 1.c) we obtain the following properties of the IPO market in regime-R.
Proposition 2 (Issue Activity and IPO Performance in Regime-R)
Suppose the equilibrium in regime-R is Proposition 1.c)'s separating equilibrium with underpricing. Then the IPO market is characterized by the following properties:
(1) The ex-ante probability that an IPO takes place at any given time, t j , j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} is equal to λp.
(2) Any IPO that takes place is an issue I , α S G (I ) that is offered by a type-G firm. The abnormal initial performance of IPOs from the issue price to the first market clearing price (i.e. from t j to t j+1 ) is equal to
(3) No abnormal stock price performance is observed after the first market clearing price. Hence, there is no abnormal long run performance of IPO shares from t j+1 to t j+ , but there is positive abnormal long run performance from t j to t j+ .
The following subsection contains an example of Proposition 1.c)'s IPO market equilibrium with underpricing. We will extend this example in Subsection IV.C, where we present results from a simulation of the IPO market dynamics.
C An Example
Suppose the value of any firm's asset in place prior to (or without) the IPO is equal to V T (0) = 100, T ∈ {G, B}. The ex-ante probability that a new project is of type-G is equal to p = 0.3, and the two types' marginal net profit functions are given by (23) and (24), respectively.
In a world of symmetric information the good type undertakes her first-best IPO, The first-best outcome is not feasible under asymmetric information since the bad type's payoff from the good type's first-best IPO exceeds her own first-best payoff: which is greater than the ratio of the two type's marginal financing costs, V G (100)/V B (100) = 1.75. 22 Hence, the good type has an incentive to signal by increasing investment up to I = 124.5, at which point
We obtain α F G (I ) = 21 Assuming linear marginal profit functions keeps the calculations tractable but also implies that we have to choose marginal profit functions that violate the assumptions (A1) and (A4) for sufficiently high levels of investment. This is not a problem, however, since neither assumption is necessary for the existence of the equilibrium of Proposition 1.
22 V G (100) = 300, V B (100) = 171 3 7 , 1 + π G (100) = 1, and 1 + π B (100) = This implies that the bad type would mimic an IPO in which the good type raises I dollars by issuing equity at the fair price, but at the same time prefers her own fist-best strategy over the pooling candidate IPO:
The pure-strategy equilibrium is consequently a separating equilibrium in which the bad type does not go public, I The equilibrium payoff to the good type's original shareholders is equal to W G (I , α S G (I )) ≈ 176.7, and the total amount of "money left on the table" is equal to
Note that overinvesting up toĪ = 150 would enable the good type to issue equity at the fair price: V B (Ī) = 185 5 7 , and V G (Ī) = 325, so that α F G (Ī) =
α F G (Ī)V B (Ī) = 100. However, the good type's payoff from doing so would only be equal to
, which is less than its equilibrium payoff.
A graphic representation of the equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2 . The three dotted curves represent the (maximal) fraction of equity that the original shareholders can retain for a given investment level for a good/bad/pooling IPO, so that outsiders still break even on purchasing the offer. The solid black curve represents the bad type's iso-payoff curve through her first-best strategy, B = 0, 1 . The solid grey curves are the good type's iso-payoff curves through her
, and through her equilibrium offer, U = I , α S G (I ) . At I the good type's iso-payoff curves are tangent to the bad type's iso-payoff curves from above. Hence, the good type prefers retaining less than the fair amount of equity over changing her investment policy in either direction. 
IV Learning by L-Investors, and Regime-L
We begin investigating what effects the presence of L-investors can have on the IPO market equilibrium by studying how their beliefs evolve as they learn about the IPO market in regime-R.
A Learning by L-Investors in Regime-R
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the IPO market starts at t 0 in regime-R. The L-investors will then update their beliefs from t 0 to t −1 only based on the respective first market clearing prices of any new IPOs. Beginning at t , L-investors will also update their beliefs whenever the realized cash flows of a firm that went public in the past are observed.
The only IPOs that take place in regime-R are IPOs I , α S G (I ) that are undertaken by good firms. Based on the first market clearing price, the market value of any such firm is equal to V G (I ). Thereafter, the market value does not change until the uncertainty with respect to the firm's cash flows is resolved. Firms that go public in regime-R are valued correctly by the market, so that the new "information" that is contained in the realized cash flows is just noise with an expected value of zero. If the IPO market was exogenously fixed in regime-R it would therefore only be a matter of time until the L-investors learn to predict the value of IPO firms with arbitrary precision.
Lemma 2 (Learning by L-Investors in Regime-R) Suppose the IPO market is exogenously
fixed in regime-R. Then the L-investors' belief with respect to the value of a firm that goes public converges to the correct value:
Lemma 2 could be generalized in a straightforward manner to a setting in which two or more firm types issue equity in regime-R. In the latter setting an equilibrium investment policy would either be undertaken by only a single firm type, in which case Lemma 2 applies accordingly, or it would be undertaken by two or more firm types that pool and issue equity at the identical terms, in which case L-investors would learn to forecast the average value of these firms. In any case, L-investors would eventually be able to predict the value of a firm that goes public in regime-R with the same accuracy as the R-investors.
, so that Lemma 2 implies that the L-investors' valuation for IPO shares will sooner or later exceed the issue price. By assumption, the Linvestors demand shares whenever they expect to at least break even on purchasing an IPO. It is therefore only a matter of time until the L-investors begin to participate in the IPO market.
Lemma 3 (Demand for IPO Shares) The L-investors demand IPO shares as soon as their beliefs with respect to the value of a firm that raises and invests I exceeds V i (I , α S G (I )). At that time the total demand for shares of IPOs I ,
The L-investors' participation in the IPO market is publicly observable due to the publicly observable increase in the demand for IPO shares. While there was already excess demand for underpriced IPOs when L-investors were absent, excess demand is even more severe now. The increase in the demand for IPO shares reveals to the entrepreneurs that it may now be possible to issue equity at a higher price.
Lemma 4 (Expected Payoff from Raising the Issue Price) Suppose that the IPO market is in regime-R, and suppose that the L-investors are demanding shares of IPOs I , V i (I , α S G (I )) .
Let V be such that V i (I , α S G (I )) < V < V G (I ). As time passes, the probability that an IPO I , V would succeed converges to one. The good type's expected payoff from offering I , V converges to the l.h.s. of (29), and the bad type's expected payoff from offering I , V converges to the l.h.s. of (30) .
It follows from Lemma 4 that it is only a matter of time until an entrepreneur will attempt to sell an IPO of size I at a price V > V i (I , α S G (I )). The first such IPO(s) may fail since the entrepreneurs do not know the L-investors' t 0 -prior, so that they are uncertain with respect to the L-investors' exact willingness to pay. An IPO I , V that fails reveals that the L-investors' 
The abnormal initial return of the IPO is non-negative, but strictly lower than the abnormal initial return in regime-R:
The first market clearing price of any IPO that takes place in regime-L is equal to the Linvestors' valuation for the shares. Once the market has entered regime-L the market clearing prices of any new IPOs will therefore just confirm the L-investors' beliefs. Moreover, since the IPOs that previously took place in regime-R were valued correctly by the market no new information is expected to be incorporated in the L-investors' beliefs for the first − 1 periods.
Regime-L will consequently persist for a number of periods. The following proposition states the entrepreneurs equilibrium strategies after the first successful IPO in regime-L.
entrepreneur with access to an investment opportunity will then successfully undertake the IPO I , V L j (I ) , irrespective of her type. The IPO is undervalued if the issuing firm is type-G, but overvalued if the issuing firm is type-B.
Based on Proposition 3 it is straightforward to derive the following properties of the IPO market in regime-L.
Proposition 4 (Issue Activity and IPO Performance in Regime-L)
The IPO market exhibits the following characteristics in regime-L:
(1) The ex-ante probability that an IPO takes place at any given point in time, t j , is equal to λ.
(2) Any IPO that takes place is an issue I ,
issuing firm is of type-G with probability p, and of type-B with probability 1 − p. The first market clearing price of each IPO is equal to its issue price. Hence, there is no abnormal initial performance (i.e. no underpricing) from t j to t j+1 .
(3) The expected value of a firm that goes public is equal to V P (I ) < V i (I , α S G (I )). The expected abnormal long run performance (from t j to t j+ , or from t j+1 to t j+ ) is negative:
A comparison of the IPO market characteristics in the two regimes reveals the following key differences:
(1) The expected IPO volume in regime-L exceeds the expected IPO volume in regime-R by the factor 1/p > 1.
(2) Issue prices are higher but the (first) market clearing prices are lower in regime-L than in regime-R. Consequently there is less IPO underpricing in regime-L than in regime-R.
(3) On average, IPOs that take place in regime-L underperform in the long run. Based on the first market clearing price there is no abnormal performance of IPOs that take place in regime-R.
A remarkable feature of our model is that IPOs have to be underpriced to avoid underperformance long run: just a small increase in the issue price changes the incentives of some entrepreneurs and results in a (potentially dramatic) decline in the average IPO quality. It is this poor performance of IPOs in the long run that eventually puts an end to regime-L. 
If regime-L persisted for long enough then the L-investors would again learn to predict the value of IPO firms with the same precision as the R-investors. However, the IPO market will revert to regime-R as soon as the L-investors' willingness to pay for IPOs of size I drops below
At that time entrepreneurs with access to bad projects find that it is no longer profitable to issue equity, and there is a sudden decline in IPO volume that is accompanied by an increase in IPO quality. 
C An Example (cont'd)
We now present the results from a simulation of the IPO market dynamics that was based on our example from Subsection III.C. With respect to the parameters that have not been specified earlier we make the following assumptions: (1) The probability that a new project becomes available at This implies that a firm's realized cash flows are always equal to its ex ante expected cash flows.
We simulate the evolution of the IPO market over a total of T = 5, 000 points in time. It may be intuitive to view each point in time as a business "day," a 5-day period as a "week," a 4-week period as a "month," and a 12-month period as a "year." With this interpretation, the true cash flow of each firm is revealed exactly one year after its IPO, and the simulation period corresponds to a time span of 20 years and 8 months. The probability that a good investment opportunity opens up on any given day is equal to λp = 0.15, and the probability that a bad investment opportunity opens up is equal to λ(1 − p) = 0.35.
Our simulation resulted in the creation of 2, 541 investment opportunities, 758 of which were of the good type, and 1, 783 of which were of the bad type. A total of 1, 017 IPOs took place, which translates into an overall average of approximately one IPO per week.
We report the evolution of L-investors' beliefs (Figure 3) , the monthly IPO volume (Figure 4 t 2,000 t 3,000 t 4,000 t 5,000 Regime-R Regime-L Regime-R Figure 6 : IPO underpricing and long run performance for the 500-day period from t 751 to t 1,250 .
opportunity are able to issue equity at a higher price. In our simulation the IPO market enters regime-L for the first time at t 800 . The regime shift is accompanied by a slight increase in the issue price from 279.71 to 279.96. Even though this price increase is too small to be noticeable in Figure 5 , it implies that IPOs are now no longer significantly underpriced, but rather significantly overpriced ( Figure 5 ). The reason for this is that firms with access to a bad project now also find it profitable to go public. The fundamental value of a bad firm that raises and invests I is only V B (I ) ≈ 180.2, so that average IPO value drops from V G (I ) ≈ 318.5 in regime-R to V P (I ) ≈ 221.7 in regime-L. However, the true fundamental firm value is not revealed until some time after the IPO, so that the drop in the average IPO quality is not immediately noticed by the L-investors. The market clearing prices of all IPOs that take place in regime-L are identical to the L-investors' beliefs. The L-investors' beliefs therefore do not change until the first cash flows of firms that went public in regime-L are observed ( Figure 3) . The cash flow realizations of the good firms that went public in regime-L will be unexpectedly high, and the cash flow realizations of the bad firms will be unexpectedly low. Based on the first market clearing price, the expected long run performance of good and bad firms that go public in regime-L is given by (34) and (35), respectively.
The overall expected long run performance of IPOs that take place in regime-L is equal to −20.8% (Figure 6 ), which leads L-investors to revise their beliefs downwards (Figure 3 ). The IPO market reverts back to regime-R as soon as the L-investors' valuation for IPO shares drops below
The plot of the L-investors' beliefs over time (Figure 3 ) reveals that the IPO market enters regime-L at three distinct occasions, t j , j ∈ {800; 2, 294; 3, 831}, and reverts back to regime-R at times t j , j ∈ {1, 043; 2, 536; 4, 074}. As we can see, a total of 1, 017 IPOs over a period of 5, 000 point in time does not result in convergence to a stationary equilibrium, even though there are only two types of firms in our model.
V Implications
Our model applies only to firms that go public to raise capital for investment. Moreover, it is crucial in our theory that the different firm types are outwardly identical so that they are indistinguishable to outside investors. Our model should therefore not be viewed as a model of the IPO market as a whole, but rather as a model of the IPO market in a particular industry.
The following empirical predictions follow readily from our results:
Implication 1 An increase in the IPO volume in an industry is observed after a period during which firms in this industry issued underpriced equity to raise capital for investment. Note that our model does not yield any clear predictions with respect to the overall average long run performance of IPOs if the latter is measured based on the issue price, rather than on the first market clearing price. However, we obtain unambiguous predictions with respect to the long run performance of IPOs in each of the two regimes.
Implication 4
The abnormal long run performance of IPOs that take place during periods of high IPO volume is negative, even if long run performance is measured based on the issue price.
Based on the issue price the abnormal long run performance of IPOs that take place during periods of low IPO volume is positive.
Implication 5
The variance of long run performance is higher among firms that go public during periods of high IPO volume than for firms that go public during periods with low IPO volume. However, this prediction may be difficult to test.
VI Conclusion
We have presented a stylized model of an IPO market in which firms go public to raise capital for investment. The model is capable of jointly explaining three major IPO market "anomalies"
that have been empirically documented in the literature: IPO underpricing, underperformance of IPO shares in the long run, and strong concentration of issue activity in certain periods. In our model, underpricing is observed even in the rational IPO market equilibrium. Some firms will optimally use underpricing to augment the information that is conveyed by the firm's investment decisions to outside investors. This enables the firm to signal the profitability of its investment opportunities to outsiders, and thereby maximizes the original shareholders' personal wealth.
Long-run underperformance and periods of increased IPO volume arise from the presence of investors who learn about the IPO market from publicly observable IPO market data. The latter investors upset the rational equilibrium not because of ex ante unreasonable beliefs, but rather because they learn to forecast the value of IPO firms based on the firms' investment policy alone, and because they are willing to purchase any IPO that is offered at a price below its inferred value.
While long-run underperformance may otherwise appear hard to reconcile with the abnormal positive returns ("underpricing") of IPOs in the short-run, the joint existence of these two phenomena may be explained with relative ease if underpricing is indeed used to signal the profitability of a firm's investment opportunities. Even a minor increase in the price at which firms can issue equity is sufficient to alter the incentives of firms with lower quality investment opportunities. This results in a sudden increase in IPO activity that is accompanied by a significant drop in the average IPO quality that leads to subsequent IPO underperformance.
A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The good type earns higher marginal returns on investment than the bad type. Moreover, for I > I F G additional investment is unprofitable for either type. Hence, there exists an investment levelĪ > I F G that the good type is still able to finance, but at which the bad type no longer prefers the payoff from the good type's correctly priced IPO over her own first-best payoff.
Proof of Proposition 1: It is straightforward to verify for each part of Proposition 1 that the proposed pure strategy combination represents a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We omit this part of the proof an show only that the proposed equilibrium is the unique pure strategy equilibrium that passes the Intuitive Criterion (IC).
By construction of the good type's equilibrium offer there exists no out-of-equilibrium IPO (I , α ), I = I , that would make the good type better off than its proposed equilibrium offer, but that is not also strictly preferred by the bad type over its own equilibrium offer. The bad type therefore cannot be ruled out a defector, and the belief that a firm that defects with (I , α )
is of the bad type with probability one is admissible under the IC. Now consider an equilibrium in which the good type undertakes some IPO (I , α ), with I = I .
No such equilibrium can pass the IC since we can construct an alternative IPO of size I that investors would be willing to purchase if it was offered by the good type, and that makes the good type strictly better off but the bad type strictly worse off than (I , α ). Hence, the bad type can be ruled out as a defector for the IPO of size I , and the good type has no incentive to stick to its proposed equilibrium strategy in the first place.
We have now established that the good type must raise and invest I in equilibrium. In each case of Proposition 1 it is easy to see that the good type cannot raise the issue price, relative to its proposed equilibrium IPO. Moreover, the bad type cannot make itself better off by defecting from its first-best strategy. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: Proposition 2 follows jointly from our assumptions and Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
For each point in time t k in regime-R we have either φ k (I ) = 0, or φ k (I ) = 1 and
Consequently, we can rewrite (13) 
As j → ∞ the first and the third term in (37) converge to zero, and the second term converges to V G (I ). Hence, we obtain (28).
Proof of Lemma 3: Lemma 3 follows directly from our assumptions.
Proof of Lemma 4:
The probability that an IPO I , V with V i (I , α S G (I )) < V < V G (I )
succeeds is equal to the probability that the L-investors' valuation for an IPOs of size I exceeds V . The latter probability converges to one since V L j (I ) converges to V G (I ) > V for j −→ ∞ by 
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4: Proposition 4 follows directly from Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 6:
The proof of Lemma 6 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 5:
This proof is done by contradiction. Suppose the economy reaches the stationary equilibrium of Proposition 1.c). Then it follows from Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and
